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Housing Markets
Dennis R. Capozza,∗ Patric H. Hendershott,∗∗ and Charlotte Mack∗∗∗
This research analyzes the dynamic properties of the difference equation that
arises when markets exhibit serial correlation and mean reversion. We identify
the correlation and reversion parameters for which prices will overshoot equilib-
rium (“cycles”) and/or diverge permanently from equilibrium. We then estimate
the serial correlation and mean reversion coefficients from a large panel data
set of 62 metro areas from 1979 to 1995 conditional on a set of economic vari-
ables that proxy for information costs, supply costs and expectations. Serial
correlation is higher in metro areas with higher real incomes, population growth
and real construction costs. Mean reversion is greater in large metro areas
and faster growing cities with lower construction costs. The average fitted val-
ues for mean reversion and serial correlation lie in the convergent oscillatory
region, but specific observations fall in both the damped and oscillatory re-
gions and in both the convergent and divergent regions. Thus, the dynamic
properties of housing markets are specific to the given time and location being
considered.
Numerous studies of a variety of asset markets have documented the existence
of short-horizon serial correlation and long-horizon mean reversion in asset
prices. Among asset markets, the most heavily researched is the equity market.
For example, Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988), using
different methodologies, find significant evidence of mean reversion at long
horizons. Fama and French conclude “predictable variation is estimated to be
about 40% of 3–5 year return variances for portfolios of small firms” (p. 246).1
Time varying equilibrium expected returns and investor overreaction have
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1 A recent study that models “fundamental” value using dividends and earnings is
Chiang, Davidson and Okunev (1997).
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been proposed as possible explanations.2 Momentum strategies, which exploit
serial correlation in asset prices, have been shown to be more profitable when
information costs are high (Hong, Lim and Stein 2000).
The focus of our research is the more illiquid U.S. single-family housing mar-
ket. Earlier studies have documented both serial correlation and mean reversion
(Case and Shiller 1989, Abraham and Hendershott 1993, 1996, Capozza and
Seguin 1996, Capozza, Mack and Mayer 1997, Malpezzi 1999, Meen 2002).
One intriguing finding in these studies is that the extent of correlation or re-
version varies with location. For example, Abraham and Hendershott (1996)
document a significant difference in time-series properties between coastal and
inland cities.
Since studies that use a wide variety of methodologies and cover many time
periods, countries and asset types all find evidence of serial correlation and
mean reversion, this characteristic may be a pervasive and ubiquitous feature of
asset markets. Some logical questions to ask are: What variables might affect the
time-series properties; why do regions react differently to economic shocks,3
and does the same region react differently over time? Our empirical tests focus
on the interaction among the serial correlation and mean reversion coefficients
and economic forces.
In this research we first provide more definition to the dynamics by translating
the standard empirical formulation for estimating serial correlation and mean
reversion into the corresponding second-order difference equation. We then an-
alyze the properties of the difference equation to derive the required values that
produce the four major dynamic structures: damped versus cyclical and conver-
gent versus divergent or explosive. By first defining the mathematical structure
implied by the empirical estimates, we are able to give rigorous definition to
terms like “overshooting” and “bubble.”
In the context of the dynamics implied by the difference equation arising from
this simple model, overshooting occurs when the correlation and reversion
coefficient pairs assume values in the “oscillatory” region where the roots of
the “characteristic” or “complementary” function of the difference equation
2 There is a long literature in international trade that explains exchange rate movements
as reversion to purchasing power parity (fundamental value). A recent example that uses
panel data is Frankel and Rose (1996), which finds “strong evidence of mean reversion
that is similar to that from long time-series” (p. 209).
3 A recent contribution by Lamont and Stein (1999, p. 498) finds that “where homeown-
ers are more leveraged . . . house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks.”
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are complex.4 Mathematically, a coefficient pair that lies in the divergent or
explosive region is one way to define a “bubble.” This divergent behavior arises
when the serial correlation exceeds one.
We then estimate the correlation and reversion parameters using a large panel
data set for 62 U.S. metropolitan areas from 1979 to 1995. The data set includes
economic, demographic and political variables for each of the metro areas. We
explore several hypotheses based on information or transaction costs, supply
costs and expectations. Housing is highly heterogeneous so that participants
have difficulty assessing the instantaneous “true” price for any given property.
In general (Quan and Quigley 1991), an optimal “appraisal” weights current and
past transactions prices of similar properties. As a result transaction frequency
can affect the rate of information dissemination in a housing market. Transac-
tion frequency also affects reservation prices in search models of the housing
market (Wheaton 1990). Whenever economic or demographic variables affect
transaction frequency, some metro areas may react either faster or with more
amplitude to a given economic shock than other areas.
Further, any given positive economic shock will be easier for an area to absorb
if the housing stock can be increased quickly and at low cost. Therefore we
hypothesize that variables proxying for the cost and difficulty of adding to the
supply of housing should affect the time-series properties of housing prices. To
preview the conclusions, we find evidence that both information dissemination
and supply factors influence the dynamics of housing prices. We also find that
the dynamics can vary over time and over locations. Most often the coefficients
lie in the convergent regions; however, there are time periods and locations
where the estimates lie in the divergent or explosive region.
Our contributions are first to provide a more rigorous structure for discussions
of house price dynamics based on serial correlation and mean reversion by ana-
lyzing the implied difference equation. Second, we provide additional evidence
on serial correlation and mean reversion in housing markets using a much larger
panel data set than in previous research. Our results are consistent with earlier
estimates but lie at the upper end of their range. Third, and most importantly, we
model and estimate equations relating the extent of serial correlation and mean
reversion to possible determinants such as information dissemination, supply
constraints and backward-looking expectation formation.
In the next section we solve the difference equation and characterize its dynamic
properties. The third section describes the panel data set we use for our estimates,
4 There are many fine references for difference equations in mathematical economics
texts. Lucid expositions appear in Chiang (1984) and Sysdaeter and Hammond (1995).
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and the fourth section discusses the empirical results. The fitted values for the
coefficients indicate the wide variation in possible dynamics. The final section
summarizes and concludes with suggestions for future research and implications
for policymakers.
Dynamics in the Standard Model
Underlying the concept of mean reversion is the basic notion that, in the long
run, markets tend towards equilibrium. Therefore, we assume that in each time
period, t, and in each metro area there is a long-run equilibrium value for the
unit price of housing space that is determined by economic conditions:
P∗t = p(Xt ), (1)
where P∗ is the log of real equilibrium value per quality adjusted square foot of
space in the metro area and Xt is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables.
In general, a relationship like Equation (1) can be viewed as the reduced form
arising from a supply-and-demand relationship. In an urban context, (1) can
arise from any open city model of urban equilibrium. For the empirical results
that follow, we base our specification of Equation (1) on the urban asset-pricing
model of Capozza and Helsley (1989).5 In the vector, X, we include the size
of a metro area (population level and real income), the real construction cost
of converting land from agricultural use to new residential structures, expected
growth and the user cost of owner-occupied housing as well as proxies for
regulatory conditions.6
Value changes in the standard model are governed by reversion to this equilib-
rium value and by serial correlation according to7
Pt = αPt−1 + β
(
P∗t−1 − Pt−1
) + γP∗t , (2)
where Pt is the log of real house values at time t and  is the difference operator.
The first term on the right in (2) is the serial correlation term where α is the serial
5 Other research on dynamics that has based the empirical estimates on this model
include Abraham and Hendershott (1996) and Capozza, Green and Hendershott (1996).
6 The choice of exogenous variables, X, will be important for the estimates that fol-
low. Empirical models that incorporate mean reversion are known as error correction
models (ECM). When estimating an ECM, the econometric properties hinge on the
existence of a “cointegrating” relationship for the variables in Equation (1). A coin-
tegrating relationship will arise when an equilibrium relationship exists among the
variables.
7 In an urban context, variations on (2) appear in the earlier work of Abraham and
Hendershott (1996), Capozza, Mack and Mayer (1997), Lamont and Stein (1999),
Malpezzi (1999) and Meen (2002), among others.
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correlation coefficient. The second error correction term causes reversion to the
equilibrium value with β (0 < β < 1) being the rate of reversion or adjustment
to equilibrium. The third term captures the contemporaneous adjustment to
fundamentals. Partial adjustment implies that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Equation (2) can be rewritten in difference equation form by substituting Pt −
Pt−1 for Pt .
Pt − (1 + α − β)Pt−1 + αPt−2 = γ P∗t + (β − γ )P∗t−1. (3)
In general, P∗t will be stochastic; however, much can be gleaned about the
dynamic properties of (2) from the illustrative case where P∗t = P∗, a constant,
and P0 = P∗. Equation (3), then, is a second-order difference equation of the
form
Pt+2 + a1 Pt+1 + a2 Pt = K , (3a)
where a1,a2, and K are all constants.
The dynamic behavior of (3) is studied by applying the “z-transform,” Bn = Pn,
and then analyzing the resulting “characteristic” or complementary functions
of the difference equation in (3) given by the quadratic8
B2 − (1 + α − β)B + α = 0. (4)
The solution of this quadratic is the pair of roots, B1, B2, given by
B1, B2 = (1 + α − β) ±
√
(1 + α − β)2 − 4α
2
. (5)
When the roots are real, the solution to the difference equation contains a linear
combination of these roots in the form
Pt = A1(B1)t + A2(B2)t + C, (6a)
where A1, A2, and C are constants.
When the roots are complex, the solution is in the form
Pt = Art cos(θ t + ω) + C, (6b)
where A, C, and ω are constants that depend on the initial conditions (see
Appendix A), r = √α and cos θ = (1 + α − β)/2√α.
8 The solution of difference equations is described in most mathematical economics
texts. See, for example, Chiang (1984) or Sysdaeter and Hammond (1995).
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Oscillations
When the roots are complex, that is, when
(1 + α − β)2 < 4α, (7)
oscillations or cycles will occur. Therefore, in α, β parameter space when the
α, β pairs satisfy (7), prices will exhibit oscillatory behavior (overshooting).
Otherwise, price changes will be damped (no overshooting).
Stability of Equilibrium
Stability of equilibrium requires that the moduli of the roots, B1, B2, both be
less than one. See Appendix A for more detail. With the restrictions from the
economics of the problem, a necessary condition for convergence to equilibrium
is that the absolute value of serial correlation, α, is less than one.
|α| < 1. (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) divide the parameter space into four regions. Figure 1
summarizes the analysis graphically in the α, β parameter space. In the figure,
Figure 1  The dynamic behavior of the difference equation. This graph
illustrates the parameter values that generate the various dynamic patterns
when equilibrium is shocked. Values of the autocorrelation coefficient greater
than 1 result in divergent or explosive behavior. Parameter values that lie
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Figure 2  Time-series behavior in the four regions. The panels illustrate the
time-series behavior of the difference equation in the four regions in response to a
ramp change (solid line) in the equilibrium house price (P∗). The dotted lines
represent the actual house price movement after the ramp change in the equilibrium
from 100 to 110 in period zero. The regions correspond to the designations in
Figure 1. A subcase of Region I occurs when alpha is less than one. In this case there
is convergent alternation in a sawtooth pattern as the negative serial correlation causes
values to alternate yearly.
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the curve defined by (7) separates cases without oscillations below the curve
from parameter pairs with fluctuations above the curve.
The vertical line at α = 1 divides the parameter space into a divergent or
explosive region to the right of the line and a convergent region to the left.
When the autocorrelation coefficient is above unity, deviations from steady
state are magnified over time and the path of values diverges from long-run
equilibrium.
The two curves divide Figure 1 into four regions. Figure 2 summarizes the
types of dynamic behavior that arise in each of the four regions in response to
a ramp change in P∗. A subcase of region one occurs when serial correlation,
α, is negative. In this subcase, price converges without oscillations but in a
two-period sawtooth alternating pattern caused by the negative autocorrelation.
Amplitude
When there are oscillations, the amplitude is given by
Art = 2(P∗ − P0)
√
αβ
4α − (1 + α − β)2 (
√
α)t . (9)
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At the first cyclical peak, which occurs approximately at t = −ω/θ , the ampli-
tude is increasing in α and β over the relevant economic ranges.
Frequency














which is ambiguous in α and increasing in β. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship
of frequency and amplitude at the first peak with the correlation and reversion
parameters.
Intuitively, the solution, (6b), in the cases with oscillations is composed of
sinusoidal oscillations between minus one and plus one with a frequency given
by θ and a phase angle or time shift given by ω. The amplitude of the oscillations
is determined by Aαt/2, which decays or grows depending on whether α is less
or greater than one. From (9) we also see that A depends on how far from
equilibrium the system starts, (P∗ − P0), and the correlation and reversion
parameters.
Extensions
A number of natural extensions of this analysis are possible but beyond the
scope of this research. In the analysis of the dynamics we assumed that P∗ is a
constant when in reality it is stochastic. If the fluctuations in P∗ have a frequency
component, for example, because there is a national business cycle driving the
fluctuations in P∗, then the frequency component in P∗ may reinforce or interfere
with the local movements in the price Pt. When the fluctuations reinforce, the
apparent fluctuations at the local level can be much larger.
It has also been assumed in (2) that the serial correlation acts on the entire past
change in price. This implicitly assumes that in an urban area that grows at an
above average rate for an extended period of time, participants do not anticipate
the steady price increases. An alternative assumption might be to have the serial
correlation act only on the unexpected component of price change.9
9 Another possible extension would be to consider asymmetric responses. This was
investigated by Malpezzi (1999), who did not find evidence of asymmetries.
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Figure 3  Frequency and amplitude at the first peak. The graphs
illustrate the relationship between frequency and amplitude and
the correlation and reversion parameters α and β. Frequency rises
steeply with β but is ambiguous in α. The amplitude at the first
peak, on the other hand, is rising steeply with serial correlation, α,



























































Amplitude at the First Peak
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The Hypotheses
Our goal is to explore the causes of differences in the dynamic response of
metro areas to shocks to the local economy. In the context of the model, these











βi (Ykit − Ȳi )
) (
P∗k,t−1 − Pk,t−1
) + γP∗kt ,
(2′)
where i indexes the variables and k indexes cities, where Yi, which may include
a subset of the X and a unit vector, are independent variables, and where Ȳi
represents the mean value of Yi in the sample.
An important issue is the choice of the Yi. A well-developed behavioral theory
for correlation and reversion does not exist in urban economics, but there are
a number of reasons to expect the adjustment to depend on information costs,
supply costs and constraints, and expectations.10
Information Costs
First consider the role of information dissemination. In real estate markets,
information costs are high, transactions are infrequent, and the product is highly
heterogeneous. As a result, participants have difficulty assessing the current
value of properties and may have to use sales distant in time or location for
setting reservation prices (Quan and Quigley 1991). Markets with a higher level
of transactions have lower information costs; thus, prices should adjust more
quickly to their long-run equilibrium value, that is, mean reversion should be
greater. Clapp, Dolde and Tirtiroglu (1995) argue that information costs will be
lower the greater the number of transactions per unit area. Thus both population
and population density, which are highly correlated, seem relevant. We include
metro area population as a proxy for the number of transactions.
Another measure of the importance of information derives from models of
search in housing markets (Wheaton 1990, DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996).
In these models, a positive real income shock causes existing homeowners to
be underhoused and thus, to move or renovate to increase their housing con-
sumption to the new equilibrium levels. When transactions volume increases,
10 In Equation (2′) we have assumed that γ is not endogenous. Allowing for endogeneity
would affect the amplitude but not the frequency.
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search costs decline and the reservation price for both buyers and sellers in-
creases. Once the adjustment to new housing needs has occurred, transactions
volume falls back to its long-run level. In terms of our model, higher real in-
come growth should proxy for higher transactions volume and lower search
costs, which should lead to faster mean reversion.
Supply Costs
A second set of hypotheses relate to the real cost of new housing. We identify
possible cost effects both within a given market and across markets. Within a
given urban area, when construction costs are high relative to the price of the
existing stock, builders will have less incentive to add to supply until unit prices
rise above the cost of new supply. Price increases will be more persistent since
new supply is not available to ameliorate price increases until existing prices
rise above the cost of new construction. We include the R.S. Means construction
cost series for each metro area as a metric for construction costs. This series
measures the labor and materials cost of construction.
Across different markets, high real construction costs vary not only because of
materials and labor costs but also with unpriced supply restrictions. Regulation
is an example of one such restriction. Stricter regulations on new development
such as minimum lot size or regulatory-induced delays have two effects: They
increase the cost of new housing (both in absolute terms and relative to existing
housing) and they reduce the ability of builders to respond quickly to demand
shocks. Mayer and Somerville (2000) show that construction is less responsive
to price shocks in markets with more local regulation.
As proxies for supply restrictions we include a land supply index (Rose 1989)
that measures the availability of land within the urban circumference. Our
metrics for regulation include measures of use fees and total fees payable by
developers and average and maximum times needed in the approval process.
In the context of our model, we hypothesize that higher real construction costs
are correlated with slower mean reversion and more serial correlation. New
supply can reduce the degree of serial correlation because, in the absence of a
futures market, it is one way that participants can arbitrage inefficient pricing.
In markets where supply can respond quickly to price shocks, serial corre-
lation should be lower. We expect the regulatory variables to have a similar
effect.
Expectations
Finally, we look for evidence of “euphoria” (Capozza and Seguin 1996),
or backward-looking expectations, as an indicator of the degree of serial
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correlation. Case and Shiller (1988, 1989) and Shiller (1990) posit that serial
correlation in real estate markets is partially due to backward-looking expecta-
tions of market participants. Case and Shiller (1988) have conducted surveys
of recent buyers, showing that buyers in booming markets have greater ex-
pected house price appreciation than buyers in a control market. Buyers in the
booming market indicate that they treat the purchase of a home more as an
investment and discuss housing market changes more frequently. By contrast,
buyers in the control market spend less time discussing the housing market
and place more weight on the consumption value of a home, as opposed to its
investment value. To the extent that these expectations are incorporated into
observed transaction prices, strong markets should have more serial correla-
tion than markets with slower growth. We include real income growth as an
indicator of the state of the economic cycle. Long-run population growth is in-
cluded to measure the role of inertia or backward-looking expectations in serial
correlation.
To summarize, higher real income and population growth and a high level of
real construction costs and regulation are expected to increase serial correlation.
Higher real income growth, larger metro area size (population) and a lower level
of real construction costs/regulation should increase mean reversion. This, of
course, is not an exhaustive list of all the possible channels through which the
dynamics might vary; rather, it should be viewed as an exploratory and illus-
trative list that allows verification that the correlation and reversion parameters
can vary over time and over space in systematic ways.
Data
Our data are a subset of the large panel data set described in Capozza, Kazarian
and Thomson (1997). The data for this study cover 62 metro areas for the 17
years from 1979 to 1995. Included among the variables are median house prices,
population, personal income, real construction costs, a land supply index, the
consumer price index, mortgage rates, property tax rates and income tax rates.
The data are annual series with the exception of income tax rates, which derive
from the decennial census. The land supply index, a measure of the percentage
of the land in the city that is available for development, also varies across urban
areas, but not over time.11 Table 1 provides summary statistics on the data
series.
The source and definition of all the variables appear in Appendix B. The
metropolitan areas included in the study are listed in Appendix C.
11 See Rose (1989) and Capozza and Seguin (1996) for more detail on this variable.
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Table 1  Summary statistics.
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Real Price in 1990 dollars 72,000 27,000 41,000 210,000
Change in real price 0% 5% −14% 29%
Population 2,300,000 3,100,000 370,000 20,000,000
5-year change in population 7% 7% −6% 31%
Real personal income 13,900 2,200 7,700 22,000
Change in real personal income 1% 2% −7% 12%
Real construction cost index 0.97 0.10 0.78 1.5
User cost 7.3% 2.2% 0.2% 11%
Land supply index 0.89 0.13 0.54 1
House Prices
Two variables require more discussion. The first is the median house price
series. There is considerable debate over the merits of using median house
price data versus repeat sales data. This study uses the NAR median price series
because of its long history and extensive coverage of metro areas. Repeat sales
data were available at the regional level from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC) but for only a limited number of Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs). The median and the repeat sales price series exhibit similar
overall patterns, but there are timing differences, especially in the Northeast and
the Southeast. The Pearson product-moment correlations of the price changes
are 0.59, 0.73, 0.89, 0.88 and 0.92 for the Northeast, Southeast, North Central,
Southwest and West regions, respectively. The correlations of first differences
suggest there will not be a large difference between empirical estimates from the
two data series. We report the results of a robustness check using the FHLMC
data below.
Because our model estimates the long-run real house price level in the first
stage, we take advantage of the level differences between metro areas obtained
with median prices. Repeat sales indexes only measure relative prices within
a city over time, but not across different cities. Thus, repeat sales data are not
well suited for estimation procedures that attempt to exploit the cross-sectional
variation by using the absolute dollar value of housing.
Neither median nor repeat sales data are fully quality adjusted. The upward
quality drift in the median prices is about 2% per year (Hendershott and
Thibodeau 1990) and occurs both because new houses of above average quality
are added and because existing houses are renovated. In the typical metro area,
much of the quality drift arises from renovations. Repeat sales data include only
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existing houses so that only the drift from renovations applies. Since typical
repeat sales procedures attempt to exclude or adjust for houses that increase
in size, the quality drift is mitigated. Many existing houses are renovated soon
after purchase. For our purposes, a constant rate of upward drift will not affect
the results since we include dummy variables for each year of the sample. A
more important issue is systematic changes in the quality of the median house
over an economic cycle. If the quality of the median house is systematically
different near peaks than it is near troughs, then the median price series will
over- or underestimate cyclical movements. However, as long as this bias is
constant across cities, it will not impact our estimates of the factors that affect
the cyclicality of prices. Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with the
appropriate caution.
User Cost
The user cost is a derived variable. It is an attempt to capture the after-tax cost
of home ownership. Our calculation adjusts ownership costs for taxes, expected
appreciation rates and maintenance and obsolescence (3%):
User cost of capital = (Mortgage rate + Property tax rate)
× (1 − Income tax rate) − Inflation rate + 0.03. (10)
Two data issues are worth noting. First, only the tax rate metrics vary cross-
sectionally so that user cost is mainly a time-series variable. Mortgage rates and
inflation rates are national series. Second, since the expected appreciation of
housing is being measured by the national inflation rate (CPI) during the previ-
ous year, the variation in expectations by location, which may be substantial, is
not incorporated. It can be argued since housing purchases are a long-horizon
decision (7 years or more), a long-run expected appreciation rate should be used.
Over long horizons housing prices have appreciated at rates remarkably close
to the rate of inflation. Nevertheless, more sophisticated measures of expected
appreciation and user cost are possible, but beyond the scope of this research.12
Empirical Estimates
Our empirics are developed in two stages. First, we estimate the proposed
long-run equilibrium price relationship, Equation (1). Second, we estimate the
adjustment relationships, Equation (2) or (2′), allowing for partial adjustment,
12 For example, Capozza and Seguin (1996) have shown that current rent-to-price ratios
are a significant conditioning variable when analyzing long-run (decadal) appreciation
rates.
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serial correlation and mean reversion. When estimating (2′), the serial correla-
tion and mean reversion coefficients vary over time and space.
In the econometrics literature, models with mean reversion are known as “error
correction models” (ECMs). If an equation like (1) is indeed an equilibrium one,
then we expect there to be a “cointegrating relationship” among the variables.
To test for cointegration, it is typical in ECM estimation to apply unit root tests
based upon Dicky–Fuller (DF) or augmented Dickey–Fuller (when lags are
being estimated) or Phillips and Perron (1988). However, Levin and Lin (1993)
suggest that such tests cannot be directly applied to panel data. Further, Pedroni
(1997) suggests that the usual applications of DF are inappropriate in order to
test for cointegration in a panel setting.
Given this context, researchers have followed various strategies. One approach
(Malpezzi 1999, Gallin 2003) has been to relate house prices to income levels.
Malpezzi rejects “the null for the estimated error in the house price to income
cointegrating vector at the 1% level” (p. 46). Gallin, on the other hand, argues
that even bootstrap methods cannot reject the hypothesis of no cointegration
between house prices and income. He cautions that the “error-correction spec-
ification may be misleading” (p. 14).
Given the difficulty of testing for cointegration in panel data sets like ours, the
approach we follow is to carefully relate Equation (1) to an equilibrium arising
from urban theory. If the theory is correct, equilibrium will exist along with a
cointegrating relationship among the variables. Thus, we are assuming that the
cointegration tests can be met. Nevertheless, Gallin’s caveat applies.
Preliminaries: The Equilibrium Relationship
We begin by fitting a long-run equilibrium equation for real house price levels
in a metro area using the annual panel data described in the previous section.
The equation is estimated in two versions, first, using OLS, and second, using
a panel data estimator that controls for both year and metro area fixed effects.
These fixed effects will capture any systematic differences in the average quality
of housing across cities or over time.
As indicated above, our choice of variables, X, is motivated by the equilibrium
asset pricing model for a small open city in Capozza and Helsley (1989).
 Population—In equilibrium, larger cities have higher rents and prices to
preserve intraurban locational equilibrium, that is, rent gradients shift
up as metro areas grow.
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 Real Income—The unit of measurement for our dependent variable is
one dwelling unit, whereas the theoretical unit of measurement is a unit
of dwelling space (e.g., a square foot of living area). Since housing is
income elastic, we expect residents of urban areas with higher incomes
to consume more dwelling space, and consequently median prices per
dwelling unit will be higher.
 Real Construction Cost—When vacant land is converted to urban uses,
costly labor and materials must be used. The higher the costs for these
items, the higher the price of the marginal dwelling.
 Urban Growth Rate—Capozza and Helsley (1989) show that land for
conversion at the edge of an urban area has a premium above the op-
portunity cost in agriculture that depends on the growth rate of the
area. When marginal land costs are higher, dwelling units will be more
expensive on average, ceteris paribus.
 User Cost—Rents are related to prices through the capitalization rate
or “user cost,” as it is more commonly called in the housing literature.
Interest rates, tax rates and expected appreciation rates all affect this
composite variable.
 Land Supply Index—The land supply index measures the percentage of
land that can be developed within the urban circumference surrounding
the urban center. Urban areas located on a waterfront will be able to
develop only a semicircle of land surrounding the center. For a given
population, the length of the average commute will be longer; in equi-
librium, the average house rent and price will be higher.
Estimates for this equation are given in Table 2. All variables in Model 1
of Table 2 have the expected sign, and many coefficients have the expected
magnitude. In particular, real median house prices are positively related to total
population, real median income, the index of real construction costs and the
five-year growth rate in population (proxying for the long-run expected growth
rate of population13), and they are negatively related to the user cost of housing
and the land supply index. Many coefficients suggest reasonable elasticities.
For example, the coefficient on real construction cost is 1.1 in Model 1 and 1.2
in Model 2 when fixed effects are included in the specification. Neither value
is statistically different from the theoretical prediction of 1.03 at the 5% level.
(The mean index value is 0.97; therefore, a 0.01 unit increase in the cost index
leads to a 1.03% (=1/0.97) increase in prices.)
13 Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that the growth rate of population is persistent over
time using state-level data over several decades.
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Table 2  Steady state regression.
Model 1: OLS Model 2: Fixed Effects
Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic
Log of population 0.07 7.7 0.15 2.9
Log of real median income 0.45 9.7 0.43 5.3
Real construction cost 1.10 14.8 1.20 13.9
5-year % change in population 1.53 16.4 1.54 13.9
Log of user cost −0.04 −3.1 −0.09 −03.2
Land supply index −0.38 −7.6
Fixed effects (city, year) No Yes
R2 0.65 0.43
Dependent variable is the log of real price. OLS estimates of Equation 1 in the text.
Model 2 is estimated with fixed effects.
The coefficients on real income suggest that a 1% rise in a metro area’s real
income leads to almost a 0.5% increase in real median house prices. If we
interpret the coefficient as an income elasticity, then consumers are buying
about 5% more housing when incomes are 10% higher. This is consistent with,
but at the lower end of, other estimates of income elasticities.14
The amount of developable land around a city, measured by the land supply
index, has a negative and significant effect on the real price level, as would be
expected. The regulatory variables were not significant and are not reported.
The real price elasticity with respect to city size (population) in Model 2 is 0.15,
which is smaller than would be obtained from a standard monocentric city urban
model. However, the existence of multiple subcenters should lower the expected
size of the population coefficient relative to a standard urban model. Long-run
growth has a large impact on real price levels; a 1% increase in the population
growth rate over the last 5 years leads to 1.5% higher real house price. Perhaps
due to limited cross-sectional variation, the user cost coefficients of −0.04 and
−0.09 are statistically different from zero, but they are far from the value of
−1.0 predicted by theory.15 Model 2 does not include the land supply index
because it is subsumed by the fixed effects.
14 It is worth noting that this estimate is not consistent with a constant price-to-income
ratio as is assumed in many studies, for example, Malpezzi (1999), Lamont and Stein
(1999), Gallin (2003).
15 In a study using similar cities but decennial data only (1970, 1980 and 1990), Capozza,
Green and Hendershott (1996) find a price elasticity of −0.8, insignificantly different
from −1.0.
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Because F-tests of the significance of the time and metro area effects reject that
these fixed effects equal zero at the 0.001 confidence level, we use fitted values
from Model 2 in the second-stage regressions.
Dynamics: The Adjustment Equation
The second-stage analysis uses the estimates of P∗ from the first-stage equation
to anchor the estimates of price changes. In particular, we estimate Equation (2)
where α represents the degree of serial correlation, β is the extent of mean
reversion and γ is the contemporaneous adjustment of prices to current shocks.
If house prices adjusted instantaneously to local economic shocks and if real
estate markets were perfectly efficient, then γ would equal 1 and α would
equal 0 (theory has no prediction about the estimated value of β because actual
house prices would never deviate from their long-run equilibrium). However,
abundant academic research has shown that α is positive and economically
and statistically significant. For example, Case and Shiller (1989) estimate that
annual serial correlation in their sample of four cities ranges from 0.25 to 0.5.16
Abraham and Hendershott (1993) obtain an estimate of 0.4 on a panel of 29
cities. When the cities are divided roughly in half, the estimate is 0.5 for the
coastal cities versus 0.2 for the inland cities (Abraham and Hendershott 1996).
When house prices converge to their equilibrium values in the long run, α > 0
implies β > 0.
Estimates from this second-stage equation are given in Model 1 of Table 3. To
control for possible omitted local factors that might cause differential appre-
ciation rates, we initially included fixed effects for all MSAs. The subsequent
regressions do not include these fixed effects in the second stage because an
F-test of the significance of these factors does not allow for rejection at con-
ventional confidence levels and the empirical work is little changed by their
exclusion.
The empirical results in Table 3, Model 1, are consistent with the previous
real estate literature and suggest slow responses for real estate relative to more
liquid assets like equities (Fama and French 1988). The immediate adjustment
coefficient, γ , for example, suggests that current house prices adjust by 52%
of the value of a shock to the equilibrium house price levels in the year of
the shock. In addition, house prices also exhibit strong serial correlation, with
16 Case and Shiller (1989) also note that the construction of repeat sales indexes induces
spurious serial correlation in estimators derived from a single sample of houses. Such a
bias does not affect our sample because we use median sales prices. Even with repeat
sales indexes, however, spurious serial correlation would only bias the intercept in the















Table 3  Second-stage price regressions.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic Coefficient T-Statistic
Change in the first stage fitted 0.52 13.2 0.53 13.9 0.53 13.9
Lagged change in real price 0.33 12.2 0.49 1.8 0.49 1.2
Change in population times lagged real price change 4.79 2.3 5.04 2.4
Change in real income times lagged real price change 5.02 4.2 5.05 4.2
Real construction cost times lagged real price change 1.47 6.1 1.62 6.0
Land supply index times lagged real price change 0.27 1.2
Deviation from steady state 0.25 13.1 0.26 1.7 0.27 1.6
Log population times deviation from steady state 0.06 2.4 0.06 2.3
Change in real income times deviation from steady state 1.40 1.7 1.43 1.8
Real construction cost times deviation from steady state −0.40 −1.8 −0.39 −1.8
R2 0.42 0.49 0.46
Dependent variable is the percent change in real housing price. Ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (6) in the text with steady-state
values estimated from Model 2 of Table 1.
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a coefficient of 0.33. This estimate is consistent with those in Abraham and
Hendershott (1996) and Case and Shiller (1989). Furthermore, our estimates
show that the other 48% of house price adjustment occurs only gradually over
time. Actual prices converge only 25% (=β) of this difference every year. This
estimate is greater than that of Abraham and Hendershott (1996) who report
a β of 0.1 for cities on the coasts (e.g., Boston, New York, San Francisco,
Los Angeles) but zero for cities in the Midwest (e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee,
Cleveland, Detroit). In the next section, we allow for variation in α and β over
both time and location.
Endogenous Dynamic Adjustment
In Table 3, Model 2, we estimate possible determinants of serial correlation and
mean reversion by interacting variables derived from the hypotheses described
earlier—information dissemination (population growth), search costs (real in-
come growth) and supply costs and restrictions (real construction costs, land
supply index)—with the serial correlation and mean reversion parameters, as
in Equation (2′). That is, serial correlation and mean reversion are allowed to
vary both over time and over space.
These estimates, presented in Models 2 and 3 in Table 3, provide significant
evidence consistent with all three of the hypotheses. The most striking results
are the determinants of serial correlation. High real construction costs and
faster growth in both population and real income are associated with greater
autocorrelation. A one standard deviation change of 2% to either real income or
the 5-year growth rate of population leads to a 10% increase in serial correlation
(a third of the overall effect in Model 1). Both of these results suggest that
house prices exhibit much more serial correlation, and thus a greater likelihood
of overshooting their long-run equilibrium values, in metro areas in the midst
of strong economic expansions.
Differences across MSAs in real construction costs lead to economically and
statistically significant differences in serial correlation. For example, an in-
crease in real construction costs of 10% would increase serial correlation by
15 percentage points—one-half of the average serial correlation coefficient in
Model 1. To the extent that high construction costs are related to inelastic sup-
ply, the costs may be indicative of factors that do not allow the supply of new
houses to adjust quickly to demand shocks. Regulation and geography are two
examples of such factors. Many types of land use regulation raise development
costs and make it more difficult for developers to respond to market signals.
Mayer and Somerville (2000), for example, show that higher levels of regulation
lead to fewer permits and lower supply elasticities. Reduced land availability,
either because of historic development or small farms at the periphery of an
urban area, may make land assembly more difficult and expensive.
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In Model 3, we explore the extent to which geography (the land supply index)
is related to the construction cost result reported earlier. However, the coeffi-
cient on the land supply interaction is the opposite of that predicted by theory
and not statistically significant. Similarly, our experiments (not reported in the
table), with regulatory variables like use fees and time to approval, proved to
be unrewarding.
While the results on the impact of various factors explaining the degree of mean
reversion are consistent with the hypotheses, they are weaker in terms of eco-
nomic and statistical significance. The interaction coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5 or 10% levels.
Metro area size is positively related to the degree of mean reversion, an effect that
would be predicted from search models with imperfect information. Information
about demand shocks is easier to discern in thicker markets in which comparable
units sell more often. Thus prices should adjust more quickly to their equilibrium
levels because homeowners can more easily determine a price for a house that
incorporates latest market information. The estimates show that prices revert to
their mean six percentage points faster in a metro area that is twice as large as
a comparison metro area.
Also consistent with search models, higher income growth leads to greater
mean reversion. As with population, the economic impact of differences in
income growth is moderate. A two percentage point increase in the growth rate
of income leads to a 3% increase in mean reversion (10% of the total effect).
Finally, a 10% increase in real construction costs lowers mean reversion by four
percentage points.
Robustness Tests
In addition to the specifications reported above, a number of alternative specifi-
cations were tried but not reported in the tables. These include alternatives using
the available repeat sales price data as the dependent variable in the stage 1 and
2 regressions. The results were quite economically similar for the equations in
Table 2, but with smaller sample sizes there is less statistical significance for
the independent variables. In the second-stage regressions, the repeat sales data
exhibit more serial correlation (0.55 vs. 0.33) and less mean reversion (0.15 vs.
0.25), suggesting the likelihood of greater overshooting.
As indicated earlier, alternative panel error specifications were also tried and
tested against the models presented. Finally, because of the importance of sup-
ply in the stage 2 regressions, additional variables on the regulatory structure
for housing supply were compiled and tested. These variables include data on
local fees payable by developers (use fees and total fees) as well as the average
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and maximum times needed in the approval process. None of these regulatory
variables was statistically significant at the usual levels in the stage 2 regres-
sions. Since casual empiricism leads us to believe that supply restrictions play
a significant role in the evolution of house prices, these negative results were
a disappointment. The negative results are consistent with either inadequate
data metrics or with no relationship. We lean towards the former explanation
and expect that as better data become available, a significant relationship with
supply restrictions will be found.
How Do the Estimates Relate to the Dynamics Defined
by the Difference Equations?
The implication of Model 2 in Table 3 is that for each time period and for
each metro area, the dynamics will vary depending on the realizations of the
exogenous variables. What do the fitted values for the 992 usable observations
tell us about the possible dynamics?
Figure 4 summarizes the results. It plots the autocorrelation and mean reversion
coefficients for each city in each year and is superimposed on Figure 1. Several
items are worth noting. First, the realizations are spread over three of the four
regions defined earlier and encompass both damped and oscillatory and both
convergent and divergent behavior.
Second, two-thirds of the realizations lie in the damped cyclical region (III; see
Table 4). Therefore, we can expect damped oscillations to be the most common
reaction to price shocks. Another 26% fall into Region I, the convergent, no
oscillation region.
Third, the remaining 69 realizations, or 7% of the cases, lie in the divergent
range where serial correlation is greater than 1. Twelve of the metro areas (20%)
Table 4  Distribution of fitted parameters for correlation and reversion.
Region Percent
Region I, Convergent, No Oscillation 26%
Subregion IA, Convergent Alternation 4%
Region II, Divergent, No Oscillation 0%
Region III, Convergent Oscillation 67%
Region IV, Divergent Oscillation 7%
Total 100%
This table lists the percentage of fitted observations in each of the regions defined in
Figure 1.
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Figure 4  Parameter realizations. This figure superimposes the fitted values
(Table 3, Model 2) for the serial correlation and mean reversion parameters for
each of the 992 metro area and year observations onto the parameter space plot
(Figure 1). The mean values for correlation and reversion, 0.47 and 0.23,
respectively, lie solidly inside Region III, the damped cyclical region. However,
the fitted values span three of the four regions. Seventy observations have
















have at least one realization in this divergent range. The metros in this group
are rapidly growing metros like Las Vegas, Riverside/San Bernardino and West
Palm Beach rather than the large metros like Boston and San Francisco that have
been associated with large price changes in recent years. Large price changes,
of course, can arise from either demand shocks and/or from parameters in the
divergent range.17
Finally, we note that the variation in the fitted serial correlation is greater than the
variation in the mean reversion parameter. While the mean reversion coefficient
varies only between about −0.05 and −0.45, the autocorrelation coefficient
varies from about −0.2 to 1.7 or about five times as much.
17 The largest three-year changes in the estimated equilibrium price occurred in the
central part of the country during the sample period. Among the ten largest are Houston,
Tulsa, Albuquerque, Oklahoma City, Birmingham and Portland in the 1980s and Denver
and Riverside/San Bernardino in the 1990s.
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Figure 5  Dynamic behavior at the sample estimates. This figure
illustrates the dynamic behavior for values of the parameters at the
sample estimates in Table 3, Model 2. The pattern is convergent and
oscillatory at these estimates. Prices overshoot by about 20% of the
shock to the equilibrium value, P∗, at time 1. The period of the
oscillations is 5.6 years. The parameter values used to generate













The typical dynamic pattern when the parameters are set to their average fitted
values from Table 3, Model 2 (α = 0.49, β = 0.26, γ = 0.53) is depicted in
Figure 5. The pattern is convergent and oscillatory with a period of 5.6 years.
By year 4, prices overshoot the change in the equilibrium, P∗, by about 20%.
The oscillations dampen rapidly after this first cycle.
Figure 6 plots the time-series patterns arising when the correlation and rever-
sion parameters are one standard deviation above and/or below their estimated
means. When the correlation parameter is high and reversion low, the time-
series pattern is still convergent but with much more persistent oscillations.
When the correlation parameter is low and the reversion high, the pattern is
convergent without oscillations. For more extreme values of the correlation
parameter (two standard deviation changes) the pattern can become divergent
oscillations (Region IV) or convergent alternation (Region I with negative α).
Conclusion
In this research we link empirical estimates of serial correlation and mean
reversion to the implied difference equation. We analyze and categorize the
dynamics of the difference equation and relate the basic features like ampli-
tude and frequency to the correlation and reversion parameters. The analysis
Anatomy of Price Dynamics in Illiquid Markets 25
Figure 6  Dynamic behavior at the sample estimates plus/minus one standard
deviation. The two panels illustrate the dynamic behavior for values of the
parameters at the sample estimates in Table 3, Model 2, plus/minus one
standard deviation. The parameters values for the first panel are α = 0.80, β =
0.18 and γ = 0.53. The parameter values used to generate the lower graph are
α = 0.15, β = 0.29 and γ = 0.53. The two graphs illustrate the wide range of

























provides a specific definition for “cycles” and “bubbles” in the context of the
standard model and relates the possible dynamic patterns to the required cor-
relation and reversion parameters. We are able to identify the correlation and
reversion parameters under which the dynamic responses to shocks will be con-
vergent (stable) or divergent (e.g., “bubbles”) and damped or oscillatory (i.e.,
“overshooting or cycles”).
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We then estimate the correlation and reversion parameters allowing the param-
eters to vary with proxies for information costs, supply costs and expectations.
That is, in the estimates, the correlation and reversion parameters can vary by
location and over time. The resulting average parameter values fall in the region
of convergent oscillations. Estimates for specific observations range over three
of the four defined regions. Two-thirds of the observations lie in the convergent
oscillations regions (III). Another 26% fall in the convergent, no oscillation
region (I). The remaining 7% are in Region IV with divergent oscillations.
Our results show that variation in the behavior of house prices across metropoli-
tan areas is due to more than just a common behavioral reaction to different
economic shocks. House prices react differently to economic shocks depending
on such factors as information costs, supply costs and expectations.
The correlation and reversion parameters are found to vary substantially among
metro areas. While the average metro area in the sample has an autocorrelation
coefficient of 0.49, an area with a zero growth rate of population and real
income and relatively low construction costs (index = 0.90) would have an
autocorrelation coefficient of just 0.23. An area with 4% growth in population
and real income and high real construction costs (index = 1.04) would have a
coefficient of 0.75. Similar types of variation in metro area size (5 vs. 10 million
people) and real income growth rates (0 vs. 4%) would lead to differences in
mean reversion of 18 to 30%, with the latter occurring in large, high real income
growth cities. Thus, information costs and supply costs appear to have a large
impact on the reaction of a metro area to shocks in the equilibrium price.
High real income growth boosts serial correlation and mean reversion, although
the former about three times as much as the latter. High construction costs, on
the other hand, raise correlation and lower reversion. High serial correlation can
cause house prices to rise significantly beyond their equilibrium and eventually
to a decline in prices. Therefore, this evidence is consistent with the behavior
of house prices in markets such as Boston and New York in the 1980s, which
had large increases in real incomes coupled with high construction costs over
this period.
This research is exploratory and highlights a number of areas where additional
study is needed. Future research could address the possible extensions to the
dynamic analysis as well as the micro foundations for the behavior of individ-
uals and markets, particularly the role of regulation, liquidity, information and
psychology.
We thank Charles Anderson, Tom Thibodeau, the reviewers and the participants in
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Appendix A: Solution and Stability of Equilibrium
for the Difference Equation
Solution
Let P∗t = P∗∀t and P0 = P∗. Then the difference equation, (2), can be written:





P(1) = P0 + β(P∗ − P0).
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The roots of the characteristic equation are
B1, B2 = (1 + α − β) ±
√
(1 + α − β)2 − 4α
2
.
Case 1. (1 + α − β)2 > 4α (Distinct Real Roots):
Pt = A1 Bt1 + A2 Bt2 + P∗,
where




1 ∓ α + β − 1√
(1 + α − β)2 − 4α
}
.
Case 2. (1 + α − β)2 = 4α (Repeated Real Roots):
Pt = (A3 + A4t)
{





A3 = 2 (P0 − P
∗)
1 + α − β
and
A4 = 2β (P
∗ − P0)
1 + α − β .




t {A5 cos (θ t) + A6 sin (θ t)} + P∗,
where
A5 = P0 − P∗ A6 = (α + β − 1) (P0 − P
∗)√
4α − (1 + α − β)2
and
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Figure A1  Stability of equilibrium. The area inside the triangle is the stable
region for the difference equation. α is the serial correlation parameter and β is















The necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to be stable is that the
moduli of the roots of the characteristic equation be both less than one. The
modulus of a complex number is the square root of the sum of the square of the
real and imaginary parts. The modulus of a real number is the absolute value
of the number (Sysdaeter and Hammond 1995, p. 756).
There are two cases:
 If the characteristic equation has complex roots, then the modulus of
each root is
√
α. Therefore for stability, α < 1 is required.
 If the characteristic equation has real roots, then the absolute value of
each root must be less than one. This requirement reduces to the two
conditions β > 0 and β < 2 + 2α.
These three conditions are represented graphically by the area inside the triangle
in Figure A1.
Appendix B: Data Sources and Definitions
Median sales price of existing homes: National Association of Realtors Real
Estate Outlook; annual data, except that latest year is the arithmetic mean of
quarterly prices.
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Metro area population: Annual mid-year estimate, Bureau of the Census; sup-
plied by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Total employment, metro area: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Nominal personal income per capita: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Local area construction cost indexes: R.S. Means Handbook.
State average property tax rates (used in calculating homeowner’s percent cost
of capital): American Council on Intergovernmental Relations Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1994. The property tax series is published
only occasionally.
National average home mortgage interest rate (used in calculating homeowner’s
percent cost of capital): Economic Report of the President for the current year,
or Statistical Abstract of the United States.
The annualized Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (used in deflating
income and house prices): Electronic edition of the Economic Bulletin Board,
October 1995. The rate of change in the previous year is the expected inflation
rate used in the user cost calculation.
Appendix C: Metropolitan Areas Included in the Study.
Code Name and Census Name
Northern Atlantic Region
Boston & Boston-Worcester-Lawrence-Lowell-Brocktn, MA-NH
(NECMA)
Hartford & Hartford, CT (NECMA)
Providence & Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket, RI (NECMA)
New York & New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA
(CMSA)
Middle Atlantic Region
Baltimore & Baltimore, MD (PMSA)
Philadelphia & Philadelphia, PA-NJ (PMSA)
Washington DC & Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV (PMSA)
Southeastern Region
Birmingham & Birmingham (MSA)
Fort Lauderdale & Fort Lauderdale, FL (PMSA)
Knoxville & Knoxville, TN (MSA)
Louisville & Louisville, KY-IN MSA
Memphis & Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA
Nashville & Nashville, TN (MSA)
New Orleans & New Orleans, LA (MSA)
Tampa & Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL (MSA)
West Palm Beach & West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL (MSA)
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Great Lakes Region
Akron & Akron, OH (PMSA)
Albany & Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY (MSA)
Chicago & Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (CMSA)
Columbus & Columbus, OH (MSA)
Detroit & Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (CMSA)
Grand Rapids & Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI (MSA)
Indianapolis & Indianapolis, IN (MSA)
Milwaukee & Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI (PMSA)
Minneapolis-St. Paul & Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI (MSA)
Rochester & Rochester, NY (MSA)
Saint Louis & Saint Louis, MO-IL (MSA)
Syracuse & Syracuse, NY (MSA)
Great Plains Region
Des Moines & Des Moines, IA (MSA)
Kansas City & Kansas City, MO-KS (MSA)
Omaha & Omaha, NE-IA (MSA)
Southwestern Region
Albuquerque & Albuquerque, NM (MSA)
El Paso & El Paso, TX (MSA)
Houston & Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (CMSA)
Oklahoma City & Oklahoma City, OK (MSA)
Salt Lake & Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT (MSA)
San Antonio & San Antonio, TX (MSA)
Tulsa & Tulsa, OK (MSA)
Dallas & Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (CMSA)
Southern California Region
Los Angeles & Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA (PMSA)
Orange County & Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove (Orange County, CA)
Riverside-San Bernardino & Riverside-San Bernardino, CA (PMSA)
San Diego & San Diego, CA (MSA)
Northern Pacific Region
San Francisco & San Francisco-Oakland, CA (CMSA)
